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Every thirst gets satisfied except
that of these fish, the mystics
who swim a vast ocean of grace
still somehow longing for it!
No one lives in that without
being nourished every day.
But if someone doesn't want to hear
the song of the reed flute,
it's best to cut the conversation
short, say good-bye, and leave.'
* Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law
(john.radsan@wmitchell.edu). Radsan was assistant general counsel at the Central Intelli-
gence Agency from 2002 to 2004. He thanks Josh Bobich, Janine Luhtala, and Erin Sindberg
Porter for taking care of the footnotes.
1. Mowlana Jalaluddin Rumi, The Reed Flute's Song, in THE ESSENTIAL RuMI 19
(Coleman Barks trans., Harper-Collins 1997) (n.d.).
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I. FROM POETRY TO PROSE
Mortals should not attempt to perform miracles. We cannot convert
water into wine at weddings, turn lead into gold in a chemistry lab, or
form a human being from a lump of clay. To accept reality is to abide by
the laws of physics. Yet, even as we come to accept that we cannot si-
multaneously measure a particle's location and speed,2 more modern
principles take us deeper into doubt. Soon, one reference gives in to an-
other, discoveries in the physical sciences affect the social sciences, and
relativity is everywhere. Not all equations can be solved.
Espionage and international law start from different points. Espio-
nage dates from the beginning of history, while international law, as
embodied in customs, conventions, or treaties, is a more recent phe-
nomenon. They are also based on contradictory principles. The core of
espionage is treachery and deceit. The core of international law is de-
cency and common humanity. This alone suggests espionage and
international law cannot be reconciled in a complete synthesis. Perhaps
we should leave it at that.
The incompatibility seems so simple to convey. But the legal acad-
emy does not tolerate the abstractions of other art forms, a stroke of
black paint on white canvas, or layers of white on white. Pages have an
insatiable appetite for words.
This Essay, in order to offer up something to that appetite, is divided
into five parts. After this introduction, I describe a Hegelian impulse, the
perpetual drive to find unity in disorder. That impulse, for better or
worse, creates the train and the track for many of the academy's jour-
neys. I then define what I mean by "intelligence activities" for purposes
of this Essay, after which I survey the scholarship that existed before this
symposium on the relationship between espionage and international law.
As the number of pages written on this topic suggests, scholarship on
espionage and international law has not been very extensive. My survey
of the scholarship concludes by leaving us in an ambivalent position:
espionage is neither legal nor illegal under international law. Espionage
exists between the tectonic plates of legal systems. Following my survey
of the literature, I describe a set of dualities that informs the international
practice of espionage. This final Part, inspired by mystical poetry, is the
most substantial part of this Essay. Coming full circle, my conclusion, as
presaged by my introduction, is that rather than force synthesis, we
should tolerate the ambiguities and paradoxes inherent in the world's
2. Werner Heisenberg, The Physical Content of Quantum Kinematics and Mechanics,
in QUANTUM THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 62 passim (John Archibald Wheeler & Wojciech
Hubert Zurek eds. & trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (1927).
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second oldest profession. Accepting that espionage is beyond the law, we
should move on to other projects-with grace.
II. RESISTING THE HEGELIAN IMPULSE
I am pleased to have been invited to this symposium. As a visitor
from a neighboring state, I hope my behavior and my comments comport
with the politeness expected from a guest in someone else's home. For
months before this symposium took place, the website for the Michigan
Journal of International Law identified the proposed topic of our discus-
sion. To focus my research, I went to that page several times. It said:
"While states may regulate intelligence gathering domestically, no sig-
nificant treaties or conventions address the process, nor is it subject to
any internationally recognized set of principles or standards .... [T]he
lacuna in international law on these matters... suggests a clear need for
focused discussion."3 In other words, although individual countries have
regulated their intelligence activities through domestic statutes, very few
countries, if any, have signed international treaties or international con-
ventions that cover intelligence activities. Moreover, customary
international law, so it seems, has very little to say about espionage.
Those who took the time to conceive this symposium label the lack
of international norms on intelligence gathering a "lacuna," that is, a
blank space or a gap in the law. Their characterization springs from two
assumptions. First, they assume that international law is empty or nearly
empty in regard to intelligence gathering. Even so, they are delicate
about asserting proof of a negative proposition. They trust that the sym-
posium's participants and speakers will join them in canvassing the
international law and, by oral or written comments, will bring any rele-
vant treaties or conventions to their attention. Second, even if they are
correct in spotting the gap, they assume there is a point or a purpose in
trying to fill it. They opt away from saying nothing or doing nothing
about the emptiness.
This second assumption reveals a Hegelian bent to the project. They
are active and dynamic toward a distant goal. Out of disorder and differ-
ences, they strive to discover (or to impose) some unity and cohesion on
espionage and international law. Hegel, in line with this enterprise, once
said, "The history of the world is none other than the progress of the
consciousness of Freedom." For Hegel, the optimism is unrelenting. The
3. Mich. Journal of Int'l Law, State Intelligence Gathering and International Law,
http://students.law.umich.edu/mji/brochure.pdf.
4. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 19 (J. Sibree trans., Dover Publications
1956) (1837).
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symposium's organizers, whether knowingly or unknowingly influenced
by Hegel, have not resigned themselves to pessimism.
There could be a value to the process of thesis, antithesis, and syn-
thesis, repeating itself toward a better developed system of international
law on intelligence gathering. Rest assured, I too am willing to march.
But my approach, inspired by mystical poetry and analytical philosophy,
remains skeptical of the ultimate value of any such Hegelian endeavor.5
It may not be fair for me to compare anyone to Hegel or to pick on
an old German philosopher. Except for pockets of support, he has fallen
out of favor with professional philosophers. 6 I may already have given
him too much credit. But in denying the Hegelian impulse, I recognize-
and assert-that some quests and questions are meaningless, that more
energy should first be spent defining our terms and concepts with preci-
sion. Caution should precede the expressions from our mouths, pens, and
computers, and sometimes we should do no more than stay silent. To
paraphrase Wittgenstein, the trick is to know what topics we should dis-
cuss and what topics we should pass over.
7
If inertia is not an acceptable resolution to the tension between es-
pionage and international law, it seems we could only move in one of
two basic directions. The first is to attempt to eradicate espionage. We
could, for instance, strip away the existing protections for spying. The
Geneva Conventions, which provide some guidance on espionage during
war, could be trimmed, and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions, which seems to protect diplomats whether or not they stick to
diplomatic activities, could be limited. In this fashion, the costs for those
who perform espionage could be raised to encourage eradication of the
practice. In fact, costs could be raised so high that spies could be sum-
5. Hegel's supporters might incorporate my antithesis as part of his process so that I
would be proving him at the same time I attempt to refute him. I would then define myself by
what I negate.
6. See Conversation Between M. O'C. Dreary and Ludwig Wittgenstein (Autumn
1948), in RECOLLECTIONS OF WITTGENSTEIN 97, 157 (Rush Rhees ed., 1984), in which Drury
recounts a conversation with the grand Austrian:
We talked for a time about the history of philosophy. WITrGENSTEIN: Kant and
Berkeley seem to me to be very deep thinkers. DRURY: What about Hegel?
WITrGENSTEIN: No, I don't think I would get on with Hegel. Hegel seems to me
to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same.
Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really differ-
ent. I was thinking of using as a motto for my book a quotation from King Lear:
"I'll teach you differences" [Then laughing:] The remark "You'd be surprised"
wouldn't be a bad motto either.
Id. I thank Russ Pannier for directing me to this source.




marily executed on the slightest of proof. It could become open season
on spies. Moving in the opposite direction, international law could be
adapted to accommodate espionage. Protections for spying could, for
instance, be strengthened under international law. The principles of the
Vienna Convention could be extended to all persons, diplomats or not,
who commit espionage. The worst that could happen to spies would be
that the country that captured them would deport them back to their
home country. In this way, the costs could be decreased so that espio-
nage would no longer be such a dangerous profession.8 How those two
possible realities would ultimately differ from the current one is difficult
to fathom and even more difficult to measure.
III. ESPIONAGE AS A SUBSET OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Intelligence can be divided into two basic categories: collection and
analysis. This division corresponds with the two main sections at the
Central Intelligence Agency: the Directorate of Operations and the Di-
rectorate of Intelligence. A "case officer" in the Directorate of
Operations collects the intelligence and an "analyst" from the Director-
ate of Intelligence synthesizes intelligence that has been collected.
Covert action, however, does not fit into the traditional categories of
collection and analysis at intelligence agencies. Covert action is not col-
lection, nor is it analysis. For purposes of the requirements of
presidential findings and congressional notification, U.S. law defines
covert action as "an activity or activities of the United States Govern-
ment to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad,
where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will
not be apparent or acknowledged publicly."9 Carved out from the defini-
tion of covert action are a string of "traditional" activities: acquiring
intelligence, performing counterintelligence, and maintaining opera-
tional security; conducting diplomatic and military activities; conducting
law enforcement; and providing "routine support" to overt activities.' °
During the CIA's history since World War II, covert action has taken
many forms: providing money and support to political parties in foreign
elections (for instance, in Italy); creating and distributing propaganda in
other countries (through platforms such as Radio Free Europe); attempt-
ing to assassinate foreign leaders (such as Fidel Castro); selling arms to
countries friendly with terrorists (Iran) so that American hostages can be
released; and training rebel armies (for instance, the Contras in
8. One would be left to wonder whether the nobility of the trade is tied to its danger.
9. The National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2000).
10. Id.
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Nicaragua)." Some of these covert actions got the CIA into trouble. Its
efforts against Salvador Allende in Chile and its involvement in the Iran-
Contra scandal are two prominent examples. The CIA's trouble, or the
"blow-back," from covert action is one reason the old guard at the CIA
shy away from it, convinced that the CIA should stay within its tradi-
tional role of gathering foreign intelligence. But President Bush, who is
reported to have authorized a comprehensive covert action plan against
al Qaeda after September 11,12 is not too troubled by the CIA's past.
The CIA is not, of course, the only gatherer of intelligence for the
United States. In the global struggle against terrorism, the CIA competes
with the Defense Department to be the most important gatherer of intel-
ligence. This stands true even though Michael Hayden has replaced
Porter Goss at the CIA and Robert Gates has replaced Donald Rumsfeld
at the Pentagon. Yet, no doubt, some of the CIA's covert actions may
overlap with the Defense Department's military functions, and today
many of the old lines between the intelligence function and the military
function have blurred.
Having hinted at some of the complications that stem from covert
action, I will leave it aside for purposes of this Essay. In that sense, I ac-
cept the recommendation of the old guard at the CIA that I focus on
"collection," or the gathering of foreign intelligence. I will adopt the
definition of foreign intelligence as "information relating to the capabili-
ties, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons,
but not including counterintelligence except for information on interna-
tional terrorist activities."'3 This definition assumes the United States was
not in a classic armed conflict during the Cold War and is not in an
armed conflict on all fronts in the current war against al Qaeda.
Sometimes the CIA does simply gather intelligence during military
operations. The intelligence that was gathered during the two Gulf Wars
under the two Bushes-the locations of Iraqi tanks, missiles, and
troops-is a classic example. Most of the time, however, the CIA's
global operations take it outside areas that fit squarely within the pat
definitions of intelligence activities or indeed within the laws of war. As
applied to foreign intelligence, there is war, peace, and something be-
tween the two.
During World War II, the Office of Strategic Services, tutored by the
British services, carried out many intelligence activities for the United
11. In the future, covert action may take the form of "information warfare," that is,
attempting to disrupt or shut down an enemy through attacks on its computer networks.
12. Dana Priest, Covert CIA Program Withstands New Furor; Anti-Terror Effort Con-
tinues to Grow, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2005, at A01.
13. Exec. Order No. 12,333, pt. 3 § 3.4, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted as amended in
50 U.S.C. § 401 note (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
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States. In 1947, a few years after World War II, the CIA was established"
as an intelligence agency for a peacetime of sorts. Congress's establish-
ment and funding of the CIA serve as part of the proof that our two
elected branches agree that both covert action (the "fifth function" from
the CIA's original charter) and espionage are necessary against other
countries, even during times of "peace." The Constitution, the National
Security Act of 1947, and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949,'"
and the unending string of congressional appropriations for intelligence
activities create a firm foundation, from the perspective of U.S. law, for
the legality of espionage that the United States commits overseas.
In this Essay, I am most interested in "intelligence," defined nar-
rowly to exclude covert action. Further, although foreign intelligence can
be gathered through both technical and human sources, I focus on the
human relationships, that is, the interactions between case officers and
agents that constitute collection. Although I am aware that the CIA also
collects information through open sources such as foreign newspapers
and the Internet, and that other U.S. agencies, including the Department
of State, are involved in collection, my focus is on the gathering of in-
formation from human beings through secret means. My definition of
espionage, one of trench coats and Fedora hats, corresponds with the
CIA's self-pronounced status as the American master of espionage. My
definition, in this way, takes espionage back to its historical and interna-
tional roots.
IV. THE LITERATURE ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Most of the literature concerning espionage and international law
addresses situations in which the laws of war apply. The rules of espio-
nage in times of war, whether based on the Hague Regulations of 1907,
the Geneva Conventions, the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions, or other sources, are straightforward. A "scout," someone who
stays in military uniform or sufficiently designates himself as a combat-
ant, risks being caught behind enemy lines.' 6 If caught, this person
14. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, ch. 343, § 102(a), 61 Stat. 497
(1947) (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 403 (2000 & Supp. III 2003)).
15. 50 U.S.C. §§ 403a-s (2000).
16. The Hague Regulations call this the "zone of operations." Convention Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Cus-
toms of War on Land art. 29, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277. The Additional Protocol calls this
the "territory controlled by an adverse party." Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
art. 46(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. The distinctions between these notions of "enemy
lines" are not significant to the conclusions of this Essay. Suffice it to say that the scout or spy
has been caught on the wrong side of the lines.
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should be dealt with as a prisoner of war because there is nothing treach-
erous or deceitful about his scouting or reconnaissance mission. But a
spy, someone who does not wear a-military uniform or a clear military
designation, is not entitled to protection as a prisoner of war. His deceit
can lead to severe punishment from the captors. Despite the potentially
harsh penalties, the trial itself for the charge of espionage should follow
standard procedures. Note, by the way, that if the spy returns to his mili-
tary organization after his mission and is then captured in battle wearing
a soldier's uniform or designation, he cannot be punished for his prior
act of spying. A spy therefore has a strong incentive to succeed in his
spying mission and to return quickly to his military organization.
The literature concerning espionage and international law outside the
laws of war is much less developed. As Richard Falk noted the year I
was born, "[t]raditional international law is remarkably oblivious to the
peacetime practice of espionage. Leading treatises overlook espionage
altogether or contain a perfunctory paragraph that defines a spy and de-
scribes his hapless fate upon capture."'7 Those words remain a fair
assessment of the state of the literature today.
The literature that does exist on peacetime espionage can be split
into three groups. One group suggests peacetime espionage is legal (or
not illegal) under international law. Another group suggests peacetime
espionage is illegal under international law. 8 A third group, straddled
between the other two, maintains that peacetime espionage is neither
legal nor illegal-perhaps, as Nietzsche would say, that it is beyond
good and evil. In any event, the uncertainty in the literature supports my
thesis that espionage is beyond international consensus.
17. Richard A. Falk, Foreword to ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, at
v, v (Roland J. Stanger ed., 1962).
18. In my article about the Totten doctrine, by which courts refuse to reach the merits of
disputes that relate to secret agreements for secret services, I have already expressed a view
about the legality of espionage. A. John Radsan, Second-Guessing the Spymasters with a Judi-
cial Role in Espionage Deals, 91 IowA L. REv. 1259, 1277-78 (2006) ("A particular
embarrassment to the government from confirming or revealing the details of an espionage
relationship, as opposed to other categories of classified information, is that espionage is ille-
gal and has no status under international law.") As noted in this Essay, the actual spy has
definitely committed crimes in the country where he operates, and, in that sense, espionage is
illegal. To say that espionage "has no status under international law" is a less artful expression
than what I have said in the text that accompanies this footnote. And even if I got something
wrong as a passing reference in another article, it would be silly and stupid of me not to admit
my mistake, to correct it, and to move on.
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A. Espionage is Not Illegal
Geoffrey Demarest agrees with this symposium that there is an in-
teresting lacuna between espionage and international law. 9 But, like me,
he is also careful to distinguish between espionage during wartime and
espionage during peacetime. To Demarest, attention in the law to "peace-
time espionage has lagged behind" the development of other
international norms concerning intelligence gathering. What there is in
law is "virtually unstated., 2' Demarest's conclusion is that, although es-
pionage is "an unfriendly act," it does not violate international law.2 In
identifying a trend whereby international organizations such as the
United Nations have increased their intelligence-gathering capabilities,
he is in favor of espionage. In fact, Demarest seeks to ensure that rules
against espionage will not apply to the gathering of intelligence through
technical means such as satellites. Further, he considers another cate-
gorical protection: "Others who are clearly intelligence gatherers (e.g.,
scholars, students, news reporters, or members of nongovernmental or-
ganizations) should not be considered spies if collecting within the scope
of their express identities., 23 His concern is to ensure that people not be
labeled spies with a broad brush, but his proposal does not address the
possibility that a news reporter, for example, could be both covering her
story and passing information to her home intelligence service. Dema-
rest's proposal also does not address how to avoid the exploitation of
such per se exclusions from the spy label by intelligence services, which
could use those excluded categories aggressively as a form of cover for
their intelligence officers.
Another of Demarest's proposals is more modest and less subject to
disagreement. He argues that captured spies, even when convicted,
should not receive the death penalty for peacetime espionage.4 Only
war, it seems, should lead to ultimate punishments. While concluding
that peacetime espionage is not illegal, Demarest also makes arguments
that could place him among those who maintain that peacetime espio-
nage in reality is neither legal nor illegal. In particular, his mention of
"preserving the paradox of espionage ' 25 is consonant with many of my
conclusions.
19. See Lt. Col. Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 321, 321 (1996).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 347.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 348.
25. Id. at 347-48.
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Demarest finds support from another military colleague, Roger
Scott. Scott asserts that "[e]spionage is not prohibited by international
law as a fundamentally wrongful activity."26 He may seem to be hedging
by adding the adverb "fundamentally," such that one is left to wonder
whether espionage is wrongful at least in some way. The rest of his sen-
tence, however, is less of a hedge: "it does not violate a principle of jus
,,27cogens. To give espionage some legal support, Scott ties it to the "right
of anticipatory or peremptory" self-defense under the UN Charter and
international law. 28 But that right, as Scott recognizes, is subject to much
debate itself. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003-when the United States
decided not to wait any longer for Saddam Hussein to confirm his com-
pliance with UN resolutions concerning the destruction of weapons of
mass destruction-heightened the debate about the nature and existence
of the right to anticipatory action. The foundation for peacetime espio-
nage, to be sure, is not as firm as it could be. Despite that fact, Scott
asserts on his own authority that "the surreptitious collection of intelli-
gence in the territory of other nations that present clear, articulable
threats based on their past behavior, capabilities, and expressions of in-
tent, may be justified as a practice essential to the right of self-defense. 29
In other words, according to Scott, espionage is "okay."
Like Demarest, however, Scott might also be better placed in the
third group, those who believe espionage is neither illegal nor legal.
Scott, identifying a "classic double-standard " '3 argues that most states,
while they conduct espionage and expect that it will be conducted
against them, reserve the right to prosecute people who commit espio-
nage within their territory.
Demarest and Scott are right to hedge. Under international law, if
something were truly legal (or at least not illegal), no state should prose-
cute those who do it. Neither Demarest nor Scott is willing to go that far
in defending espionage, and rightly so.
B. Espionage is Illegal
In the opposing camp, Professor Manuel Garcia-Mora believes that
"peacetime espionage is regarded as an international delinquency and a
violation of international law."'" Professor Quincy Wright, for another,
26. Cmdr. Roger D. Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and Interna-
tional Law, 46 AF. L. REV. 217, 218 (1999).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 224.
29. Id. at 225.
30. Id. at 226.
31. Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenses
Under the Law of Extradition, 26 U. PTT. L. REv. 65, 79-80 (1964).
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believes peacetime espionage violates a duty that states have under in-
ternational law "to respect the territorial integrity and political
independence of other states. 32
Ingrid Delupis comes out even more strongly against the legality of
espionage. According to Delupis, "espionage appears to be illegal under
international law in time of peace if it involves the presence of agents
sent clandestinely by a foreign power into the territory of another
state. '33 Her definition of espionage, however, turns on the nature of the
clandestine activity. What is not clear in Delupis' account is whether
"clandestine" includes intelligence officers who enter a country under
the false pretense of being diplomats (using diplomatic passports with
the local immigration authorities) or whether she would limit the defini-
tion to those who, unknown to the local authorities, sneak into the
country. Either way, Delupis makes the further qualification that espio-
nage is not by itself an international crime. Here she draws a fine
distinction between behavior that is contrary to international norms and
behavior that constitutes a crime. International crimes are acts that can
be prosecuted before an international tribunal: genocide, torture, or other
war crimes. To her knowledge, international tribunals, whether in Nur-
emberg, The Hague, or elsewhere, have not indicted or convicted anyone
for the simple wrong of espionage."
So, it seems that even those who take a hard line against espionage
add qualifications to their views. Between the apparent chasm separating
the first and second groups, there is much room for subtlety and nuance.
C. Espionage is Neither Legal Nor Illegal
Two former CIA officials, Daniel Silver and Frederick Hitz, state
that "[t]here is something almost oxymoronic about addressing the legal-
ity of espionage under international law.' 36 That is an authoritative view,
packed into one page in a national security casebook, from a former
General Counsel and a former Inspector General at the CIA. Speaking of
the "ambiguous state of espionage under international law,'"37 they con-
clude that espionage is neither clearly condoned nor condemned under
32. Demarest, supra note 19, at 338 (citing Quincy Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine
of Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs, in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 17, at 12).
33. Ingrid Delupis, Foreign Warships and Immunity for Espionage, 78 AM. J. INT'L L.
53, 67 (1984).
34. Id. at 68.
35. See id.
36. Daniel B. Silver, Intelligence and Counterintelligence, in NATIONAL SECURITY
LAW 935, 965 (John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 2d ed. 2005) (updated and re-
vised by Frederick P. Hitz & J.E. Shreve Ariail).
37. Id.
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international law. The rules and the ethics are situational. Countries are
much less tolerant when espionage is committed against them than when
they are committing it against friends and foes. Whether espionage is
legal or illegal under international law, they are realistic about the fact
that countries, for reasons of self-defense and for their own interests, are
going to commit espionage in other countries. According to Silver and
Hitz, that may explain why no treaties or conventions specifically pro-
hibit espionage.
Another commentator, Christopher Baker, places his view of espio-
nage in the third, in-between category. As he argues, "international law
neither endorses nor prohibits espionage, but rather preserves the prac-
tice as a tool by which to facilitate international cooperation."3 Harking
back to another era when the Americans and Soviets negotiated over the
size of their nuclear stockpiles, Baker demonstrates that shared intelli-
gence can be very useful in monitoring and enforcing agreements on
arms control. "Without espionage," Baker claims, "countries could be
required simply to accept the information provided by other treaty part-
ners as accurate."39 Clearly, that will not suffice.
President Kennedy, so Baker hints, had a broader range of policy op-
tions during the Cuban Missile Crisis because of good human and
technical penetrations into developments in Cuba. Further, Baker argues
that this "functional" approach to espionage will assist international co-
operation in dealing with many other problems. Today those include
terrorism, pollution, international trafficking of narcotics, the spread of
diseases such as AIDS and SARS, ethnic conflicts, and illegal migration.
Professor Simon Chesterman, a contributor to this symposium,
agrees that espionage creates functional benefits for the international
community, and he further suggests that the benefits of sharing intelli-
gence with multilateral organizations could lead the international
community to develop new international norms.40 In particular, Chester-
man points to the beneficial use of shared intelligence in presenting the
case for preemptive military action,4' justifying targeted financial sanc-
tions against persons and groups, 2 and supporting international criminal
prosecutions. 3 While Chesterman is modest in his suggestions, he should
be more modest in his conclusions. These examples simply show that a
38. Christopher D. Baker, Tolerance of International Espionage: A Functional Ap-
proach, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1091, 1092 (2004).
39. Id. at 1105.
40. Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in From the Cold War: Intelligence and
International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1071, 1099-1100 (2006).
41. Id. at 1101-08.
42. id. at 1109-20.
43. Id. at 1120-26.
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state will cooperate in sharing intelligence when doing so serves a par-
ticular interest. One-off deals, however, are a very slow and indirect way
to achieve international consensus on the legality of espionage. The gap
is still there.
V. A STRING OF DUALITIES
Those who are inclined to let things be can stop here. Or, if they
continue to be drawn to espionage, they can bounce back and forth along
a string of dualities with me. The dualities go way back in history, and
they apply to intelligence practices in many countries. My discussion of
the U.S. example is just one string within the themes and variations from
international practice. Contrary to an idealistic agenda, the dualities do
not lend themselves to an overarching synthesis of the legality and mo-
rality of espionage.
A. Heroes and Traitors
People become spies in one of three basic ways. Some volunteer,
some are recruited, and some join through a practice in between. Case
officers, who measure themselves by how many "scalps" they have
taken, tend to exaggerate how much they did to bring a spy into the fold.
For instance, they claim recruitments where more objective observers
would see volunteers. In any event, handling spies once they have
crossed the Rubicon to the other side requires great skill. Case officers
must conduct countersurveillance to ensure their meetings with the new
spies in "safehouses" or other locations are not monitored through tech-
nical or human means. Mistakes are costly. If the countersurveillance
fails, the spy or agent will be "rolled up," meaning arrested, tortured, or
executed.
All intelligence services perform surveillance and countersurveil-
lance. These are related skills in the sense that the rabbit and the fox are
all part of the same hunt. If a case officer cannot master these skills, she
will be of little use to her service. Intelligence services may speak differ-
ent languages around the world, but the language of surveillance and
countersurveillance is uniform, a sort of espionage Esperanto. 4 Usually
the case officers who handle spies do more countersurveillance than sur-
veillance; their colleagues in counterintelligence might specialize in
surveillance.
44. Law enforcement officers must also master these skills to the extent they run under-
cover operations (for instance, penetrating organized crime groups).
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Case officers around the world must also be adept at various secret
means of communication. These range from chalk marks to dead drops
to highly sophisticated transmitters. If opposing services intercept these
communications, consequences for the spies and their handlers can be as
grave as countersurveillance gone bad. Lives are lost and reputations
ruined.
The United States may be more advanced in the technology it uses
for espionage, but the skills of espionage are generic and international.
Foreign services can use their ingenuity to compensate for what they
lack in technology. For example, some foreign services, without poly-
graph machines, use other means to determine whether candidates,
employees, or sources are telling them the truth. Services in other coun-
tries are said to be better than the CIA at recruiting and handling human
45sources.
Espionage, like medicine or engineering, transcends the political
constructs of international borders. The skills are certainly adjusted for
local differences, but repairing a broken leg or building a bridge over a
river, like assessing, developing, recruiting, and handling human sources
of information, is very much the same all over the world. Espionage, as a
professional pursuit, speaks an international language. For this reason, it
does make some sense to speak of international standards of espionage.
CIA officers and KGB officers had more in common with each other
than they did with lawyers and accountants in their own countries. Intel-
ligence officers are part of the same guild. The existence of implied
espionage standards, however, does not automatically produce uniform-
ity in international law concerning espionage. Trade practices and the
laws of trade are not the same concepts.
Though the skills associated with espionage appear to transcend po-
litical boundaries, the morality of espionage stays local. Moral relativism
is inherent in espionage. If an American officer, an Ames or a Hanssen,
goes over to the other side, we call him a traitor. We prosecute him to the
fullest extent possible. 6 But if someone from the other side, a Popov or a
Penkovsky, comes to our side, we admire him. If he comes for ideologi-
cal reasons rather than for money, we might even call him a hero. The
memoirs of CIA officers speak with respect and admiration of Soviet
45. See JOSEPH E. PERSICO, ROOSEVELT'S SECRET WAR 203 (2001) (describing how
M15 turned its captured German spies during World War II, a thought that "never entered
[President Roosevelt]'s head" when eight Germans were captured on American soil in 1942).
46. Both Ames and Hanssen, after accepting plea bargains, are serving life sentences.
See e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Former Air Force Analyst Convicted in Spy Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
2003, at A17 (discussing the plea bargaining and sentencing of Robert. P. Hanssen); David
Johnston, How the EB.I Finally Caught Aldrich Ames, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1995, at Al8 (dis-
cussing the capture and fate of Aldrich Ames).
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intelligence officers, whether from the KGB or GRU, who came to the
Western side.4 ' But the same memoirs vilify the Americans who helped
the other side: from the Rosenbergs selling atomic secrets all the way to
the John Walker family ring selling cryptographic machines and codes.
This double-speak may simply be for public consumption. In private,
sophisticated case officers must be aware of the paradoxes of their trade.
This may explain why many case officers keep a personal distance from
their sources, withholding their home phone numbers and using their
cover names. Their volunteers and their recruitments, after all, are some-
body else's traitors, a paradox not easily ignored.
Aldrich Ames, for example, did not express any remorse about the
Soviet citizens who were executed after he revealed their identities to the
Soviet services as CIA/FBI assets.4 '8 Ames considered them all players,
like him, who knew the risks and the benefits of their game. The FBI
turncoat, Robert Hanssen, walked in Ames's footsteps. Both Ames and
Hanssen understood the rules. Living in two layers of shadows, they be-
came rich and received encouragement from their Russian handlers as
long as their true affiliations were not revealed to U.S. law enforcement.
Once exposed, they would have found protection in Russia had they got-
ten out of the United States. Like Kim Philby, the British master of
deceit, they would have been provided dachas and given access to the
extra money that had been set aside for them in local accounts. Once
revealed and arrested within American control, however, they faced exe-
cution and long terms of imprisonment. In the end, there was little the
Russians could do for them. The same fate awaited the Russians who
joined Team America. Although the skills of espionage transcend bor-
ders, the spy's physical location makes a huge difference when he is
revealed, compromised, or "outed." In his original home, he will face
severe consequences. In his new home, he will be treated well. For a spy,
sometimes one international flight makes all the difference in the world.
The moral relativism inherent in international espionage creates a
sort of moral equivalence among the intelligence services. Their activi-
ties are neither fully good nor fully bad. Any chance of moral advantage
depends on the superiority of their political system. During World War
II, for example, not much separated the German intelligence services
from the Soviet services in the way they conducted their business. Both
were professional, ruthless, and effective. Both services recruited spies
in the other country. Good intelligence created slight advantages, but the
47. See e.g., RICHARD HELMS & WILLIAM HOOD, A LOOK OVER MY SHOULDER: A LIFE
IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 131-32 (2003).
48. PETE EARLEY, CONFESSIONS OF A SPY: THE REAL STORY OF ALDRICH AMES 203-
05, 347-50 (1998).
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war was won and lost based on economic and military might. For such
reasons, the Soviet services ended up with the winners, the German ser-
vices with the losers. The amorality of espionage may have been part of
the reason that, after the war, the Americans and the Soviets, without
much compunction or hesitation, bid for the services of German intelli-
gence officers and networks. They were hiring free agents who went
beyond political systems.
B. Inner Doubts
Even the successful recruitment creates its own doubts. Nothing is as
simple as it seems. To make sure the spy is not a double agent, penetrat-
ing operations and planting disinformation, the recruiting service will
spend months checking the spy's "bona fides." This is standard practice.
If the spy came over easily, that is a sign. If the spy came over despite
great resistance, that is another sign. If the spy gives "chicken feed" or
information that is already known, that is a sign. If the spy gives over
"the crown jewels" or very useful information, that, too, is a sign. What
these signs mean in the total equation is subject to endless debate, revi-
sion, and controversy. It is a form of espionage semiotics, and it is one of
the reasons James Angleton, a former head of the CIA's counterintelli-
gence branch, described espionage as a journey through a wilderness of
mirrors. 9 It takes people, in a test of their sanity, into stranger universes
than Alice's Wonderland. To this day, people will debate whether Yuri
Nosenko was a true defector from the Soviet Union or a double agent
sent to the United States to take us off the trail of supposed Soviet in-
volvement in the Kennedy assassination. Angleton, to his grave, stuck
with the double agent theory,0 while most of his brethren went with the
true defection.
In my opinion, John le Carr6 is masterful in displaying the moral
ambivalence inherent in espionage. As the reader makes her way through
Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy to The Honourable Schoolboy, to Smiley's
People, she realizes that not much separates the British spymaster,
George Smiley, from his Soviet counterpart, Karla. Their methods and
temperament are similar. They are alter-egos, the dual faces to the para-
doxical craft of intelligence. As a guild within a guild, they have more in
common with each other than they do with the lesser members of their
organizations. They are lonely.
49. Jim Hoagland, Spooking the CIA, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2004, at B07. It is widely
believed that Angleton borrowed this phrase from the T.S. Elliot poem "Gerontion" even
though he claimed to have coined it. David C. Martin, Letter to the Editor, The Origin of
Quotes, N.Y TIMES BOOK REV., July 6, 1980, § 7, at 18.
50. JOSEPH J. TRENTO, THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA 283-86 (2001).
[Vol. 28:595
The Unresolved Equation
Le Carr6 may not be popular with case officers because he holds up
a mirror to their duplicitous profession. Consider Alec Leamas' self-
reflection at the end of The Spy Who Came in From the Cold: "What do
you think spies are: priests, saints and martyrs? They're a squalid pro-
cession of vain fools, traitors too, yes; pansies, sadists and drunkards,
people who play cowboys and Indians to brighten their rotten lives. Do
you think they sit like monks in London balancing the rights and
wrongs?"5' By contrast, some case officers may prefer the tidiness of a
James Bond movie. There, in a glamorous setting, with women in vari-
ous stages of undress, it is obvious to all who the good guys are and who
the bad guys are. But, for the rest of us, that clear casting of black and
white from the movies does not convey the dull gray of what intelligence
officers do in the shadows. For that, Le Carr6 has penetrated deeper into
the soul of the spymaster than Ian Fleming has. For espionage, the truth
is multi-faceted and contradictory, and it is not susceptible to straight
rules and regulations.
If the spymaster has a soul, it must be a mystical one, a balancing of
dualities and contradictions that goes beyond the conventional formulas
of ordinary faith. His morality goes beyond good and evil. One might
attempt a regulation that states that our case officers are good and that
theirs are bad, but that would be risible to case officers and citizens with
any self-awareness. Further, that would not lend itself to anything close
to a loose international consensus which, at a bare minimum, is neces-
sary for the regulation to become international law.
Slavery is wrong-on that there is an international consensus. 2 The
only consensus that exists concerning espionage is that sometimes it is
right and sometimes it is wrong; it all depends on the circumstances.
While paradox is acceptable in poetry, it is not a solid foundation for
international conventions and treaties.
C. Domestic Activities and Foreign Activities
The U.S. system separates domestic intelligence and foreign intelli-
gence. Since September 11, in both the domestic and foreign spheres,
51. JOHN LE CARRE, THE SPY WHO CAME IN FROM THE COLD 246 (1963)
52. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 4,
G.A. Res. 217A (IH), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948);
see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
344 (explaining that "[a] treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a per-
emptory norm of international law"); id. art. 64 (explaining that the principle of jus cogens, or
peremptory norms, places increasing limitations on state behavior in regards to human rights);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (1987) ("[A] state violates interna-
tional law [jus cogens] if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones (a)
genocide; (b) slavery or slave trade; (c) the murder or ... disappearance of individuals; (d)
torture... ; (e) prolonged arbitrary detention; [or] (f) systematic racial discrimination....").
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countering terrorism has been our top priority. Threats to U.S. national
security exist outside the United States in the form of radical Islamic
groups and possibly inside the United States in the form of sleeper cells
and sympathizers. Outside the United States, the CIA takes the lead. The
CIA, however, by its charter and executive orders, is prevented from tak-
ing on an "internal security" function. This prohibition was supposed to
allay fears of an all-encompassing security institution. Inside the United
States, therefore, the FBI and the relatively new Department of Home-
land Security are the lead agencies. Yet, the lines between the domestic
front and the foreign front are not always clear. The CIA is permitted, for
example, to gather information that relates to threats to its domestic fa-
cilities. Such an exception, if interpreted too expansively, could erode the
rule against the CIA operating on U.S. soil. Further, as the FBI expands
the number of its overseas offices-through legal attachrs in various
U.S. embassies-the lines between the CIA and the FBI will blur even
more.
The U.S. system seeks both competition and cooperation from its in-
telligence agencies. Two prominent areas of overlap and turf battles54 are
counterintelligence and the debriefing of Americans who have traveled
overseas. The trend since September 11 has been to attempt to break
down the wall between the CIA and the FBI so that the agencies share
more information and personnel. This breaking down of walls, aided by
the Patriot Act55 and a decision from the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court of Review, 6 while good for operations, may well create
imbalances in the protection of civil liberties.
Democracies are reluctant to concentrate too much of the intelli-
gence function within one agency. Such concentration, even if it leads to
more effective intelligence gathering, creates too much temptation for
political leaders to use the security services against their political oppo-
nents. What we fear is something far worse than Richard Nixon's
"enemies list" of those who were to receive extra attention from the In-
ternal Revenue Service. We fear the dirtiest tricks. A concentrated or
53. 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-4a(d)(l) (West Supp. 2006) ("The ... Agency shall have no
police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions.") (emphasis
added); see also Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941, 59945 (1981) ("[T]he CIA
shall: [conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States and, without assuming
or performing any internal security functions...... ) (emphasis added).
54. For a description of the CIA-FBI rivalry, see generally MARK RIEBLING, WEDGE:
FROM PEARL HARBOR TO 9/11 -How THE SECRET WAR BETWEEN THE FBI AND CIA HAS
ENDANGERED NATIONAL SECURITY (2002).
55. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272, §§ 201-25 (2001).
56. In re Sealed Case No. 01-002, 310 F.3d 717, 734-36 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
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consolidated intelligence function is, after all, a hallmark of oppression,
more in line with the Cheka or the KGB than with the checks and bal-
ances of limited government. This reluctance to concentrate the
intelligence function manifests itself in the United States in a split be-
tween domestic and foreign intelligence activities. Of course, even
countries that do have a consolidated service (for instance, the former
Soviet Union) usually separate their divisions for domestic security
(more a police function) and foreign operations (the stuff of classic es-
pionage). But the divisions in consolidated services occur within one
agency, while the divisions in the intelligence services of democracies
result in separate agencies that have their own leaders and different char-
ters.
Most developed countries attempt to gather foreign intelligence,
whether they do so through a consolidated service or a separate foreign
service. Almost every developed country participates in the great intelli-
gence game. From the perspective of each state's interest, it would be
irresponsible to opt out of the game. The world is simply too dangerous
for national leaders to turn a blind eye to external threats. The need for
intelligence about one's neighbors and their political, military, and eco-
nomic developments is paramount. In a faster and more integrated world,
states can lose their competitive edge very quickly. As one country
achieves a breakthrough in technology, another country closes the tech-
nological gap through state-sponsored theft. In a dog-eat-dog
competition, even friends and allies spy on each other. Loyalty, if there is
any, is to national interests, not to the international interest. Until the
system of nation-states is replaced, until regional and international inte-
gration really take hold, intelligence services will be around to do their
states' bidding.
National intelligence services are far from being integrated into re-
gional command, such as with NATO's military model, or into an
international peacekeeping function under, for instance, the auspices of
the United Nations. Intelligence, along with the military, the economy,
culture, and sports, remains just one more arena for national competi-
tion.
In the world's intelligence community, foreign intelligence services
are most affected by the laws of other countries, and foreign intelligence
services would be most affected by any international law or convention
on intelligence activities. While domestic services fish in home waters,
foreign services travel across boundaries and obstacles to fish in foreign
waters. The CIA, like the foreign services of other countries, operates on
every continent.
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To do their jobs, the CIA and the FBI cannot limit themselves to
domestic sources of information about foreign threats. When they seek
accurate information about Iran's nuclear programs, sources in Tehran
will be more useful than those in San Diego. A general rule of espionage
is that the nearer the source is to the information it provides, the more
valuable the information. On-site human sources can reveal the inten-
tions of a country's leaders in a way that distant satellites cannot; those
sources can get into the very minds of the officials. During the Cold War,
the CIA sought sources in the Politburo. In the run-up to the Second Gulf
War, the CIA scrambled for sources in Saddam Hussein's inner circle.
Now, most potential Iranian assets with access to valuable information
live in Iran, but the lack of a U.S. diplomatic presence in Iran makes re-
cruiting assets there difficult. Fortunately, some Iranians-scientists and
engineers and others-travel to the United States, a more promising
place for the CIA or the FBI to pitch them.
Allowing Iranian scientists and engineers into the United States ex-
poses another duality of espionage. From a counterintelligence
perspective, it is a risk to let these people into the country because they
could conduct terrorist acts here or gather information that they could
use against us when they return home. From an intelligence perspective,
however, having them here makes it easier for the FBI and the CIA to
assess, develop, and pitch them as spies. Similarly, if the FBI and the
CIA identify a traitor in their ranks, law enforcement officers might push
for the traitor to be prosecuted in the interests of deterrence and retribu-
tion, while intelligence officers might try to use the traitor against the
service that recruited him, feeding disinformation in a triple-agent opera-
tion. In the final analysis, nothing is clear-cut in espionage. Sometimes
white seems like black and black seems like white. Sometimes white is
white and black is black.
Returning to the Iranian example, the CIA cannot be binary in its ac-
tivities. Some Iranians may travel to third countries, never setting foot in
the United States. Wherever the potential sources wander, the case offi-
cers must follow, carrying the necessary bait, lures, and rods to hook and
reel them in. Espionage is thus the ultimate form of fishing. To twist this
metaphor, one must always remember that while CIA case officers are
trying to hook sources, fishermen from other services are trying to hook
our case officers. In the sea of possible sources, a case officer is a big
catch because she usually has a bellyful of sources and smaller fish. An
even bigger fish than a case officer would be the head of another service
or another state. 7




Although the languages and home ports for the world's intelligence
services are different, the principles of espionage are shared in common.
Tradecraft, whether practiced by Americans, Britons, Israelis, Russians,
Italians, or others, is much the same. At bottom, each service is trying to
obtain access to other countries' secrets. The more sensitive the secret,
the more highly placed the "catch," the more valuable it is to the service.
"Friendly services" trade information they have gathered in "liaison op-
erations.*5 8 Sometimes even enemies make deals. 9 To paraphrase John
Le Carr6, the international intelligence community is a trading pit for
secrets, open twenty-four hours a day, every day of the year, on every
continent.6° Within that global market, nothing is barred. Nothing pre-
vents us from spying on our enemies and nothing prevents friendly
services from spying on each other. The Israeli recruitment of Jonathan
Pollard, when he was with the U.S. military, is a case in point. Almost all
is fair game in espionage. The Israelis may forthrightly "declare" their
intelligence officers to U.S. authorities in the Washington embassy-and
then sneak in additional officers under deeper cover.
Sometimes services are split beyond the traditional divide between
domestic and foreign intelligence functions. The United Kingdom and
the United States, for example, both further divide the domestic function,
though they do so differently. While the American FBI houses law en-
forcement and intelligence activities, the British separate national law
enforcement (namely, Scotland Yard) from the gathering of domestic
intelligence (through M15). This separation, which is not uncommon in
the rest of Western Europe, has inspired many calls for reform in the
United States, especially from those who believe the FBI will never
adapt to its new role of preventing terrorist attacks.6'
58. The United States and the United Kingdom have a special relationship that dates
from the British role in establishing the U.S. Office of Strategic Services during World War II.
See generally CHRISTOPHER ANDREW, FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY: SECRET INTELLI-
GENCE AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 1-2, 131-35 (1996)
(discussing the admiration President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had for British intelligence
operations). "Roosevelt's most important personal contribution to the development of the
wartime intelligence community, apart from the creation of the OSS, was to approve intelli-
gence collaboration with Britain on an unprecedented scale." Id. at 135.
59. For example, although Syria causes the United States much trouble in the Middle
East, it has been reported that the Syrian services, in a program of extraordinary rendition,
have cooperated with the CIA in the aggressive interrogation of suspected terrorists. See Jane
Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's "Extraordinary Rendition"
Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106-07 (describing the plight of Maher Arar, a
Canadian national, who was rendered to Syria for interrogation because the U.S. government
suspected him of being a terrorist).
60. Trailer Interview with John Le Carrd, TINKER, TAILOR, SOLDIER, SPY (Acorn Media
2004).
61. See RICHARD A. POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS 169-97 (2005) (discuss-
ing hurdles to the FBI becoming a proficient domestic intelligence service). See also WILLIAM
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D. Inner Divisions
The CIA gathers foreign intelligence primarily from operations out-
side the United States. So, for the CIA, the "spy-versus-spy" aspect of
espionage occurs when officers in the Directorate of Operations operate
on foreign soil against the counterintelligence branches of other coun-
tries. In this regard, some cities have been recognized as international
centers for spying: Berlin, Vienna, London, Lisbon, and others. Spy nov-
els and movies, for this reason, are accurate on a basic point: wherever
influential people go, case officers will follow. Wherever case officers
go, other case officers will follow.
Outside the United States, the CIA is mainly on offense, prowling
for information. Back at headquarters in McLean, Virginia, the CIA is
often on the defense. There the many CIA employees and other govern-
ment officials with access to classified information work together to
coordinate and assist their colleagues in the field on foreign operations.
Meanwhile, opposing intelligence officers in the American field might
be searching for secrets under the cloak of diplomatic immunity or, even
more dangerously, lurking well outside diplomatic circles. Wherever the
threat originates, the CIA must keep house.
Because foreign intelligence takes espionage across international
borders, it might seem to open up space for customary international law.
Although I remain skeptical that international law can reasonably apply
to intelligence activities, domestic or foreign, I do recognize that intelli-
gence conventions and treaties might turn their attention to the regulation
of foreign activities. One strong draw is that foreign services are more
uniform in their conduct than are domestic services. As a parallel, think
of the uniformity of Hilton hotels around the world as compared to the
diversity of local inns, guesthouses, and beds and breakfast. Scholars
other than myself may note this uniformity and feel compelled to impose
it even more rigidly on intelligence activities. No matter-for all ser-
vices, the rules of the game are quite simple: we spy on them while they
try to keep us out, and they spy on us while we try to keep them out. In
other words, each side plays both offense and defense.
E. The Limits of Law
U.S. law is more comprehensive concerning domestic intelligence
activities than foreign intelligence activities. In response to the Supreme
E. ODOM, FIXING INTELLIGENCE FOR A MORE SECURE AMERICA 180-82 (2d ed. 2003) (sug-




Court's decision in Keith,62 which stated that warrantless surveillance of
a CIA facility in Ann Arbor, Michigan, violated the Fourth Amendment,
Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)63 to
regulate the gathering of foreign intelligence within the United States.
Under this statute, the executive branch must obtain authorization for
searches and electronic surveillance for national security purposes via
secret court proceedings. For years, FISA was the exclusive means by
which the FBI, CIA, and other U.S. agencies could gather foreign intel-
ligence through searches and electronic surveillance within the United
States, until President Bush ordered the National Security Agency after
September 11 to conduct surveillance of phone calls, emails, and other
communications suspected to be connected to al Qaeda without first ob-
taining warrants through FISA. Note, however, that FISA does not apply
to searches and surveillance conducted outside the United States. So,
although some constitutional protections may accompany U.S. citizens
overseas, U.S. law gives its intelligence services a much freer rein when
they conduct activities away from the homeland. In short, as one more
duality, we tolerate some behavior only so long as it does not occur at
home.
The CIA, learning from the excesses that were revealed in the
Church Committee and other congressional hearings in the mid-1970s,
makes great efforts to comply with U.S. law. The CIA's Office of Inspec-
tor General is now active, and the Office of General Counsel has
expanded. Even so, the CIA, as a stealer of secrets, is not overly con-
cerned with the laws of other countries. In fact, American case officers
routinely encourage other people to break the laws of those countries.
As a lawyer at the CIA, I helped the Agency and its officers to keep
their operations, abroad and at home, consistent with the U.S. Constitu-
tion, relevant executive orders, and internal regulations. Many of these
regulations are classified annexes to public executive orders, only to be
seen by those with security clearances. But the CIA cannot snap its fin-
gers and make all the paperwork go away. The statutes and classified
regulations, like much else in U.S. law, do not have carve-outs for the
CIA; its lawyers work with lawyers in other agencies, who are usually
cleared for limited purposes, to accomplish both important and mundane
tasks. The CIA, though viewed as a "rogue elephant" by its detractors, is
not above all law.
62. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (referred to as Keith
case after the first judge to hear it, Damon J. Keith).
63. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-62
(West 2006)).
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To remain in compliance with U.S. law, CIA lawyers must master
various legal sub-fields: ethics, federal contracting, rules, and environ-
mental regulations, among others. These lawyers, however, do not need
to develop any expertise in the domestic laws of other countries; the CIA
takes for granted that its operations will violate an array of foreign laws.
Since the CIA conducts global operations, it probably violates the laws
of most countries in the UN General Assembly. Similarly, many coun-
tries in the General Assembly are currently violating U.S. law, trying to
pry our secrets from the public and private sectors.
The split between domestic and foreign operations for U.S. intelli-
gence agencies parallels a split in the legal advice the CIA receives: the
CIA's lawyers make great efforts to keep the CIA in compliance with our
domestic laws, but the same lawyers are blissfully indifferent to foreign
laws. Unlike corporate lawyers in New York and Washington, CIA law-
yers do not need to retain or consult local counsel to make their
international deals happen.
Intelligence officers often enter other countries with false documents
and under false pretenses. They do not reveal their missions to foreign
authorities. If they did, depending on the circumstances, they would be
denied entry, returned as personae non gratae, or prosecuted. Intelli-
gence personnel go overseas to assist those who are committing
espionage or to convince others to "conspire" against their own coun-
tries. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for the CIA to accomplish
its mission if it were required to comply with foreign countries' laws. As
necessary, CIA officers overseas break into premises; they lie and steal.
That is what we train them to do. They are promoted for conduct that
would put them in prison if done in the United States.
The hope for the U.S intelligence community is that the beast can be
contained. That is, we hope that the lawlessness will remain outside U.S.
jurisdiction. The CIA's "black bag" jobs, which it conducts in capitals
around the world, are supposed to be off limits in our own capital. Out-
side the United States, the CIA prowls the alleys without a leash. Inside
the United States, the CIA is supposed to behave as a domesticated ani-
mal. As we learned during Watergate, however, sometimes CIA officers
stray from the leash. Among the Watergate burglars was a former CIA
officer, E. Howard Hunt. And since September 11, many fear the CIA
has strayed even further.
F. Espionage Statutes
U.S. statutes reflect the domestic/foreign duality of espionage. If an
employee is caught carelessly walking out of CIA headquarters with a
top-secret document, he may lose his security clearance and his job. If an
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employee walks out of Langley, not out of carelessness, but with the in-
tent to sell the document to a foreign intelligence service, he will have
stepped into the purview of treason and the espionage statutes.6 Because
traitors are treated harshly, he will be risking his life. On the other hand,
if an American case officer can enter FSB 65 headquarters in Moscow and
walk out with secret Russian documents, he will receive enthusiastic
praise and a medal from his colleagues. The act of walking out with a
document is the same, but, depending on the intent and on the location,
the consequences can be quite different.
It is possible for U.S. espionage statutes to be amended to have full
extraterritorial effect; the United States could make it a crime for its citi-
zens to steal military, diplomatic, and intelligence secrets from other
countries. But the reward for such self-righteousness would be mockery
and disbelief. Other states would not then preclude their intelligence ser-
vices from stealing secrets from foreigners and foreign governments.
Even if they took that step, they would not enforce the preclusion.
U.S. espionage statutes could be extended in a more limited fashion
to private citizens, keeping personal frolics separate from authorized
missions. Accordingly, a private citizen who did not have authorization
from the U.S. government could be prosecuted for stealing a document
from the FSB. Yet, again, I doubt that other countries would reciprocate
by extending their espionage statutes to cover the stealing of American
secrets by their private citizens. As the United States is not likely to con-
strain itself in ways that others will not, I doubt that even this limited
extension of the espionage statutes has a chance of reaching international
consensus.
G. Extraditable and Non-Extraditable Offenses
The transfer of suspects and convicts from one country to another can
be undertaken formally, through the courts and foreign ministries of the
sending and receiving states (extradition), or informally, without the courts
(irregular or extraordinary rendition). Under customary international law,
64. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-98 (prohibiting the collection, transfer, sale, or loss of "de-
fense information" for the purpose of using the information either to injure the United States
or benefit a foreign nation); Economic Espionage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39) (2006) (prohibiting the collection, duplication,
possession, transfer, or sale of trade secrets for the purpose of using the trade secret to benefit
a foreign nation or anyone other than the United States); 50 U.S.C § 783(b) (2006) (prohibit-
ing the receipt or attempted receipt by a foreign agent of classified information from any U.S.
government officer or employee).
65. The Federal Security Service (FSB) of the Russian Federation is a successor to the
KGB.
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states may have some duty to cooperate on extraditions. 66 Extraditions
are usually conducted according to bilateral or multilateral treaties.
These treaties spell out the great discretion sending states have in turning
down a request for extradition. The treaties usually require that the
criminal offense that serves as the basis for the request be a crime in the
sending country as well. Thus, states may refuse to extradite a suspect to
the United States if the only charge is a violation of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act,67 a statute that does not exist in comparable form in many
other jurisdictions. Further, the treaties usually provide that a suspect
will not be extradited for a "political offense." The United States has, for
example, refused to extradite Irish suspects accused of taking part in IRA
activities back to the United Kingdom.68
Extradition treaties therefore provide some evidence of crimes that
have reached the level of international consensus. For the purpose of this
Essay, we might ask whether suspects accused of espionage are readily
extradited from one country to another. If they are, that would suggest an
international consensus on the criminality of espionage. If they are not-
and espionage is treated more like a political offense-that would sug-
gest international disagreement or a contradiction between domestic
norms and international norms. That contradiction would help prove this
Essay's thesis. By now, it should come as no surprise that some proof is
already there.69 In the case of Abu Omar, for example, the Italians are
seeking the extradition of CIA officers, not for committing espionage in
Italy, but for allegedly kidnapping the radical Muslim cleric from the
streets of Milan. ° Kidnapping, but not espionage, is an international
crime.
H. Legals and Illegals
International law does affect one aspect of international espionage.
Some case officers, pretending to be employed by some agency other
66. See Heman de J. Ruiz-Bravo, Monstrous Decision: Kidnapping is Legal, 20 HAST-
INGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 853 (1993) (stating that customary rules of international law pertaining
to extradition have emerged through the execution of hundreds of extradition treaties between
countries; even if certain provisions common to such treaties are not included in a particular
treaty, "they still exist as rules of international customary law").
67. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977), as amended by the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1415 (1988).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
69. See Garcfa-Mora, supra note 31, at 83 ("[T]he point is generally accepted that trea-
son, sedition and espionage fall in the category of purely political offenses ... since they
affect the peace and security of the State without in any way violating the private rights of
individuals.").
70. Former CIA Operative Refuses to Cooperate in Rendition Case, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10,
2007, at CIO (reporting that an Italian prosecutor has requested extradition of CIA suspects,
but the Italian government has not yet ruled on the request).
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than their intelligence service, travel overseas under diplomatic immu-
nity. They are declared as diplomats to the receiving country's foreign
ministry and placed on the diplomatic roster. If diplomats are caught per-
forming espionage (which is not, of course, on the Vienna Convention's
list of permitted diplomatic activities), the worst that can happen to
them, pursuant to the Vienna Convention, is that the receiving country
can declare them personae non gratae and expel them from the country.
7'
During the Cold War, expulsion of Soviet case officers from the United
States often led to Soviet reprisals. In the practice of international espio-
nage, this is a common practice of tit for tat.7"
Diplomatic immunity therefore protects both legitimate diplomats
and case officers posing as diplomats from being ensnared by the domes-
tic laws of the receiving country. Separate from espionage, think of a
legitimate diplomat who, in a drunken state, kills a pedestrian on the
streets of Washington, D.C. Unless his home country waives his immu-
nity, the United States could not prosecute him. Even so, diplomatic
immunity does not legalize what he has done; on his return home, he
might be prosecuted for what most people would recognize as a wrong.
Espionage has a different nuance. Diplomatic immunity does not legal-
ize the case officer's practice of espionage. But if a case officer is caught
and returned home, at most, he will be punished in an administrative set-
ting for professional incompetence. He will not be criminally charged for
doing his job.
Affording a case officer diplomatic protection has disadvantages,
however. To have diplomatic immunity, he must be on the receiving
country's diplomatic roster. The receiving country's intelligence and se-
curity services routinely assume, unless confirmed otherwise, that
everyone on the list, no matter the formal designation, is an intelligence
71. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 9(1), Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. There is some indication that a few state authorities have prosecuted
foreign "diplomats" for espionage, not considering the spy activities to fall within the scope of
"official functions" protected by diplomatic immunity. Swiss authorities, according to Joan
Donoghue, prosecuted "a former diplomat who had allegedly committed espionage while
accredited to Switzerland." Joan E. Donoghue, Perpetual Immunity for Former Diplomats? A
Response to "The Abisinito Affair: A Restrictive Theory of Diplomatic Immunity?", 27
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 615, 627 (1989). This Swiss example is the exception, not the rule.
Such prosecution invites retaliatory prosecution by other countries, something that goes
against broad protection for diplomats for real or trumped-up charges.
72. See Chesterman, supra note 40, at 1089; Christopher Marquis, Striving to Punish
Cuba, U.S. Expels 14 of its Diplomats, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2003, at All; David Rohde, In-
dian Diplomats Expelled, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2003, at A6; Paul Lewis, France Ousts 3 Soviet
Diplomats It Calls Spies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1987, at A7; Seth Mydans, Moscow Expels an
American Diplomat as Spy, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1985, § 1, at 13; Bernard Gwertzman, Af-
ghans Expel 2 U.S. Diplomats, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1983, at A5; Serge Schmemann, Soviet
Orders a U.S. Diplomat Expelled on Charge of Spying, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1983, § 1, at 114.
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officer. As a part of standard tradecraft, they will check his background
and conduct surveillance. The FBI, which has primary counterintelli-
gence responsibility within the United States, does this with diplomats
who are declared to our State Department. The scrutiny and surveillance
obviously make it difficult for the case officer to conduct his espionage
business. Diplomatic immunity therefore limits his effectiveness. For
this reason, many intelligence services place case officers into foreign
countries without diplomatic immunity. Those officers do not stand out
as diplomats, making it easier for them to maintain some cover for their
intelligence activities. Far away from their embassies, they can pretend
to be business consultants, members of nongovernmental organizations,
or tourists.73
In the parlance of international espionage, those without diplomatic
immunity are often labeled "illegals." Properly understood, this labeling
should not create any confusion about the effects of domestic or interna-
tional law on espionage. Any case officer's activities, whether done
under diplomatic immunity or not, are illegal in the receiving country.
The simple difference between the "illegal" and the "legal" is that, if
caught, the former may be prosecuted abroad while the latter may not.
Even so, some states acknowledge at a later date illegals who have been
caught and prosecuted in other states, and their returns are negotiated.
Not all illegals are left to rot, disavowed as intelligence officers or facili-
tators. For example, after the Soviets shot down a U-2 aircraft in 1960,
President Eisenhower put aside a CIA cover story about weather prob-
lems and eventually acknowledged that the pilot, Francis Gary Powers,
was performing a surveillance mission. In 1962, the United States nego-
tiated Powers' release to the United States in a trade for the Soviet
illegal, Rudolf Abel, who had been captured by U.S. authorities.
Like Powers, a captured illegal case officer can become a bargaining
chip in negotiations between states. The two states, as occurred more
than once between the United States and the Soviet Union during the
Cold War, can trade illegals and dissidents, and those trades can lead to
dramatic exchanges in places like Berlin. Those trades are, at a mini-
mum, a tacit acknowledgement that the traded person was an intelligence
officer or someone important enough to justify the home country's inter-
est in participating in the trade.
73. Michael T. Clark, Comment, Economic Espionage: The Role of the United States
Intelligence Community, 3 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 253, 267-68 (1997) (discussing potential
advantages of using intelligence sources not connected to official cover).
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VI. FINAL VERSES
Around and around we go with the second oldest profession. What
we do to them is "gathering intelligence"-something positive, worthy
of praise. What they do to us is "performing espionage"-something
negative, worthy of punishment. But without the negative sign that de-
pends on the circumstances, X equals X. Gathering intelligence is just
the flip side of performing espionage, and performing espionage is just
one part of a country's broader effort for survival. Beyond any interna-
tional consensus, countries will continue to perform espionage to serve
their national interests. Negative or positive, it all depends on who does
what to whom. International law does not change the reality of espio-
nage.
